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Black Boxes in the wreckage?  
Making sense of failure in a third sector social enterprise  
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the experiences of a single social enterprise that grew rapidly but ended in 
failure. Over more than 8 years, the author conducted intensive field research during the social 
enterprise’s life and held detailed post-mortems with key players after its death. This material is part of 
longitudinal research on social enterprise activity in the voluntary and community sectors, (Pharoah, 
Scott and Fisher, 2004; Russell and Scott, 2007). It is complemented by a review of five studies of 
social enterprise failure, together with some wider reflections about reporting on various ‘troubles’ (e.g. 
error, failure and scandal). The primary emphasis is upon problems involved in ‘making sense’, but is 
illustrated with reference to the experiences of this case study and the limited literature relating to 
social enterprise failure. 
Keywords 
Social Enterprise; longitudinal research; failure; case study; organisational learning. 
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Researching failure 
Researchers interested in identifying and discussing the dimensions of organisational failure in the 
Third Sector face a number of obstacles: these include:  
 a common assumption that third sector activities are to be regarded in a positive light; 
 problems associated with the conceptualisation, data collection and reporting on failing, and 
failed, activity. 
The ‘Double Halo’ effect 
Two overlapping assumptions complicate much research into errors, scandals and failures in the 
third sector; these can be termed the ‘Double Halo’ effect. In the first instance policy elites, both in 
government and the third sector, have prioritised the use of positive pictures of voluntary and 
community activities. When instances of unwitting incompetence, deliberate malpractice or just plain 
‘bad luck’ arise, these are often explained via references to individual and exceptional behaviour 
rather than in relation to systemic and recurrent influences. A popular theme, often accompanying 
mass appeals in the wake of natural disasters or underpinning televised extravaganzas such as 
‘Children in Need’, is contained in the assertion that, although the third sector‘… has its share of 
rogues and time-servers…, at its best it does wonderful things on tight resources‟ (McRae, 2009). 
At least there is here an acceptance that the romanticism about the sector’s ‘inherent purity‟ (see 
Salamon, 1995, 15) is no longer accepted. But, there are still academic studies of third sector scandal 
and mismanagement of resources that conclude: ‘…The idiom: „a few rotten apples can spoil the 
barrel‟, however, seems applicable‟ (Gibelman & Gelman, 2001, 63). There may (or may not) be only 
a few rotten apples, we just don’t have sufficient evidence. In any case, the question remains as to 
whether the ‘apples’ and the ‘barrel’ should be the only focus of critical attention. To continue the 
metaphor, perhaps the orchard, its soils and the vagaries of the climate should also come under 
scrutiny? 
A second halo has surrounded much writing about Third Sector Social Enterprise (TSSE). Some 
authors even appear to have a belief in its limitless potential. For example, from a UK-based 
commentator we are informed that, ‘… at the moment (my emphasis) we don‟t necessarily have the 
capacity to meet all the needs of mainstream society‟ (Ahmed, 2009). Meanwhile, on the world stage, 
we are confidently informed that social  ‘…entrepreneurs, for some reason deep in their personality 
know, from the time they are little, that they are on this world to change it in a fundamental way‟ 
(Bornstein, 2007, 125). 
Much less common are those voices questioning the promotional discourse surrounding social 
enterprise at conferences, in government documents and marketing material (Foster & Bradach, 
2005). One such voice seeks to pull the rhetoric closer to everyday experience, by sounding a 
sceptical note about the: 
„Nice positive stories, easily digested by politicians and policy wonks… (but raise the 
question)… do such comic-strip portrayals inspire anyone else, or do they leave the rest 
of us mere mortals feeling powerless?‟ (Greenland, 2008). 
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It is likely that closer attention to the everyday experiences behind the rhetoric will reveal some 
exciting and positive examples but these will be interspersed with a much more mixed picture of third 
sector agencies in general and their social enterprise variants in particular. Ultimately the problems for 
students of failure will not be solely methodological. They will also derive from questions about how to 
penetrate a number of personal and professional barriers likely to hinder progress to a more holistic if 
still incomplete conclusion. 
Good practice: poor practice 
References to ‘Halo Effects’ frequently imply that the assumptions with which they are associated 
are so taken-for-granted as to constitute a form of common-sense; what sociologists call ‘Hegemony’ 
i.e. ideas so powerful as not to be questioned and indistinguishable from ‘what everybody knows’. 
More usually, those responsible for managing agencies are aware of flaws in their work, but seek to 
present a more positive picture.  A recent review of performance improvement issues in public 
services came to what appears to be a counter-intuitive conclusion i.e.: 
„Reviewing cases of poor performance presents a stronger reality check for organisations 
than looking at good practice. This is because public organisations are now well used to 
playing the performance game and presenting their activities in the best possible light ‟ 
(Walshe et al, 2009, 33). 
Walshe and his colleagues go on to suggest that rich material for organisational learning can be 
obtained from the inspections, audits and public inquiries relating to poor and failing performance. This 
is a helpful yet incomplete response. What remains underdeveloped are the processes of negotiation, 
trust-building and disclosure which are surely necessary to achieve what they call „… a greater sense 
of reality than good practice.‟ (ibid). Two brief illustrations expand this point, by identifying the different 
opportunities and constraints experienced by external and internal commentators or evaluators 
respectively. 
An external commentary (DTA, 2002) 
The Development Trusts Association (DTA) published ‘fabulous beasts’ as a set of 23 miniature 
case-studies of social enterprise by community-based organisations; one of these was Enterprise 
Action. Despite the brevity of the example, two commentary strands are identifiable. Firstly, there are 
broadly positive references to: 
 „a network of social enterprises‟; 
 „a cohesive network‟; 
 ‘good reputation feeds its momentum‟; 
 „visibly sustainable practice‟. 
Encouragingly, interwoven with the above, are hints of a qualitatively different kind: 
 „grew creatively and chaotically‟; 
 „turned serendipity into a coherent strategy‟; 
 „a lot of bobbing and weaving‟. 
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In the text the former remarks are briefly illustrated whilst the latter are barely visible. Just between 
the lines lurk chaos, serendipity and a familiar metaphor from the textile industry. Given that the whole 
purpose of the publication was to accentuate the positive, this could be seen as merely a 
presentational issue; both the authors and the interviewee from EA wanted to tell a ‘fabulous’ story. 
Would it have helped if the author could have spent more than a short time in the organisation? For 
example, A
1
 cited as typical the visit of a journalist who visited EA in order to produce a ‘case-study’ as 
one of a collection of twenty for the Learning and Skills Council: the visit lasted one hour. 
External and internal perspectives: contradictory evaluations (Russell & Scott, 2007, 42-47) 
A central theme of this section is how the location or site of the researcher, together with ethical 
and political constraints, have considerable influence on the content of evaluative comment. 
The context was an ‘Academy for Social Entrepreneurs’ at which embryonic social entrepreneurs, in 
receipt of financial grants, attended a series of sessions designed for their support and development. 
A professional evaluation team, hired by the sponsoring agency, concluded that: 
„The course was very popular and there is a strong case for continuing the work … The 
most valued elements…were the regular weekly sessions with specialist speakers, 
networking and peer support opportunities and intensive training sessions‟(External 
Evaluation, 2005). 
In marked contrast, the person responsible for designing and delivering the course felt that: 
„The weekly workshop format doesn‟t really work… from what I‟ve seen, some of the work 
that people are doing as a result of the sessions isn‟t that good. But, that could be 
resolved if we had more time to do individual work, but we don‟t … I think that the 
scheme as I its set up just isn‟t right for most of these people…’ (Internal Evaluation, 
2004). 
The first evaluation had a lot of ground to cover: this included a review of documentary materials, a 
focus group and 52 interviews (47 by telephone). They did not observe much, nor did they spend 
much time with the author of the second evaluation. As a result they failed to detect (or, at least, to 
write about) negative/failing elements of the course or workshop. Meanwhile the course organiser kept 
his evaluation to himself, no doubt calculating that there was nothing to be gained from making it 
public. Ironically, the sponsoring agency did not continue the work, despite only having seen a totally 
positive account. 
In the case of the EA commentary, potentially negative elements were identified but not developed. 
Different vantage points, with different investments in revealing or hiding more complex pictures, 
produced markedly different versions of failure and inconsistency. 
Case studies of failed TSSEs 
Five published case-studies of collapsed social enterprises in the USA and the UK are illustrative of 
the very limited literature in this field. Table 1 summarises some of their principlefeatures including 
name, primary focus and presented explanation(s) of the collapse. All of the commentaries look at 
organisational goals, structures and reported behaviours after the confirmation of failure. There are 
few signs of research conducted during the failing process nor is there much evidence of attention to 
the wider operating environment. 
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Case Study Author Overview Key Findings 
Aspire Tracey & 
Jarvis, 2007 
A participant observation study of a 
collapsed franchise venture 
employing homeless people. This 
concluded that, whilst three-quarters 
of newly-established franchise 
systems in the Business Sector fail 
within the first decade, a key feature 
of social enterprise is its need to 
manage tensions between social and 
commercial goals.  
Dual goals „… make goal 
alignment more complex and 
resource intensive than in 
business format franchising, 
leading to higher agency 
costs.‟ 
Youth 
Industry’ 
Lanzerotti, 
2002 
A family of projects for homeless 
young people. This confirmed the 
conclusion of Tracey & Jarvis, using 
the metaphor of salad dressing! – the 
oil and water of social and 
commercial goals need constant 
mixing, otherwise they separate. If 
separation occurs they can no longer 
use the label ‘Social Enterprise’.  
The authors emphasised that 
mixing (social and enterprise) 
was difficult „… to sustain, 
requiring a constant infusion of 
energy to shake things up and 
keep them in balance‟. 
Community 
Service 
Organisation 
Dart, 2004a A counselling and social support 
agency. Here, the goal alignment 
dilemma is more sharply defined. In 
this study ‘failure’ is related to 
mission rather than economic failure. 
The author concludes that 
„…business goals may be 
compatible with only a specific 
and narrow cluster of 
traditionally understood non-
profit organising values.‟ 
Two Social 
Enterprises  
Twersky & 
Lanzerotti, 
1999 
A consultancy report on closure. The 
two main conclusions appear to at 
least partially contradict Lanzerotti, 
2002.  
Firstly, there is recognition that 
business and social goals 
should receive the same level 
of commitment, but without 
any strong sense that this 
might be problematic. 
Secondly, it is assumed that if 
the commitment is present 
then social mission 
opportunities would inexorably 
follow. 
Four failed 
social 
enterprises 
Seanor & 
Meaton, 
2008 
Emphasises the importance, firstly, of 
the wider operating environment and, 
secondly, of issues around ambiguity 
(no single, clear message) and 
uncertainty (several interpretations 
available simultaneously). 
Trust is vital, but little sense 
that it is likely the mix of 
‘social’ and ‘enterprise’ may 
accentuate the very 
ambiguities and uncertainties 
which often erode this. 
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One set of questions emerging from the case-studies concerns definition. Different organisations 
called themselves ‘Social Enterprises’ without recourse to an accepted terminology. For example, one 
commentator (Dees, 1998) offers two polar types of ‘Philanthropic’ (= closer to traditional third sector 
social mission agencies) and ‘Commercial’ (= closer to market-oriented organisations). Inevitably, two 
polar types frequently produce ‘mixed’ types, driven by a determination to achieve a ‘balancing act’ 
between social and commercial. 
Nearly all the studies of failure stay focused on the organisation and say little or nothing about 
extra-mural political and economic systems. Most crucially, all the accounts skate over the questions 
surrounding data collection and analysis. How they researched and made sense of failure is either 
implicit in their accounts or relatively opaque. 
How is ‘failure’ conceptualised? 
‘Failure’ can be said to exist when part or all of an organisation ceases to operate. On the other 
hand, that same organisation or part may be described as ‘Failing’ if they are consistently not fulfilling 
their own explicit aims and mis-using their human and financial resources. In the first case the 
emphasis is on an end state, where we can talk of ‘Summative’ evaluation. The latter is essentially 
about processes or ‘Formative’ evaluation. Attempting to identify failing and failure within an 
organisation is hard enough: when we are urged to include scrutiny of the external environment at the 
same time, then data collection and the related explanatory tasks often appear impossible. 
At a popular and personal level positive thinking rules. ‘Think positive’, and ‘always look on the 
bright side’ are written deep into western cultures. Dare we do otherwise? There is a literature which 
includes references to the supposed ‘power of negative thinking’ (Leve, 2009) at an individual level, 
and suggests that ‘most things fail’ in the lives of organisations and governments (Ormerod, 2006). 
The latter author summarises neatly, by way of an evolutionary metaphor, that: 
„Species, people, firms, governments are all complex entities that must survive in 
dynamic environments which evolve over time. Their ability to understand such 
environments is inherently limited‟ (op cit, 221). 
Such pessimism, about the limits of individuals and organisations to predict and plan in an 
uncertain world, has been given added weight during the current economic downturn (Kaletsky, 2009), 
confirming the stance taken by many social scientists who increasingly argue that „… the best we can 
hope for in writing about the external world is degrees of failure (i.e. part truths)…‟ (Back, 2007, 155). 
It appears therefore, that ‘Failure’ is becoming ‘normalised’ in the sense that the world is pictured as 
more uncertain than (at least some) increasingly modest social and economic scientists can explain. 
Part of this tendency derives from a recognition that individual and small group behaviours cannot be 
totally separated out from those analyses which consider what we call the ‘bigger pictures’. For 
example, when one commentator asserts that „… as increasingly wide swaths of human society 
become conceptualised as markets, then the businesslike hybrid face of social enterprise is 
legitimate…‟ (Dart, 2004, 421) then it is appropriate to ask questions about how such big picture 
ingredients as ‘society’, ‘markets’ and ‘business’ have been conceptualised. Is it possible that social 
enterprise as an element of government and corporate policy is being used:‘… both as a distraction 
from and a response to the significance of broader inequalities (societal and global) and as a re-
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branding (and re-deployment) of resources rather than the creation of additional ones.’? (Pharoah, 
Scott & Fisher, 2004, 11; see also Amin et al, 2002) 
How might failures be researched? 
If we are to get beyond the unrealistic expectations engendered by the constant re-telling of a small 
core of success stories (Foster & Bradach, 2005, 94), it will be important to begin with the assumption 
that failure is more normal, more frequent and more predictable than hitherto alleged. Many corporate 
institutions, such as medicine and aviation have set up systems of disclosure which do not begin with 
punitive and legal intent. Rather, their starting-point is that „… it‟s the process not the individuals in it, 
that requires closer examination and correction‟ (Gawande, 2003, 64).   For example, when a plane 
crashes, lands badly or just avoids a mid-air collision, fairly soon afterwards established ‘de-briefing’ of 
all those centrally involved occurs. Pilots may be systematically questioned, even re-trained to 
incorporate new insights on such aspects as handling characteristics, landing speeds and their 
interaction with wind and weather conditions. Similarly, many medical institutions have established 
regular internal reviews of operating procedures which in certain instances offer a sanction-free space 
for open discussion of error and failure. Whilst some larger third sector agencies may have evolved 
forms of recording which facilitate regular analyses of failing and failure, it is almost certain that a 
majority of third sector agencies refrain from formalisation. Perhaps a first step would be the 
encouragement of a culture change from defensive and often opaque procedures to at least greater 
internal transparency. It will not be enough to simply call for a variety of methods and time periods to 
promote more participant and longitudinal approaches. Even the closest EA informant limited his 
disclosure until after the agency had gone into administration. 
At present two main alternative research approaches appear to offer models for greater pro-
activity: these are firstly the whistle-blower, and secondly those familiar commissions which are set up 
in the wake of the death of a child. Both tend, however, to locate failure within the agency, whereupon 
individuals and institutions are quickly ‘blamed’. If the likelihood of failure and errors could become 
part of normal discourse instead of the outcome of moral panics then there is at least the possibility 
that the culture of organisations might become less defensive. Until then the external researcher will 
continue to depend on a mixture of participation and observation based on trusting relationships with 
one or more insiders. 
Enterprise Action – its rise and rise, fall and fall2 
EA was essentially a traditional mission-driven third sector agency which convinced sponsors for a 
time that it was something else i.e. a social enterprise. This seemed to be a new way of gaining 
recognition, funds and support. The Double Halo effect also proved temporarily useful, in spite of 
continuing difficulties with internal monitoring and accounting systems. This section summarises: 
1. the main phases of the research and explores the usefulness of the aviation-derived ‘Black Box’ 
metaphor for making sense of a failed/failing organisation; 
2. the origins and growth of EA, paying particular attention to the significance of its interaction with 
the external environment; 
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3. the uneven usefulness of different research approaches. 
Three phases of research 
 30/5/02 – 5/6/03: twelve day visits for intensive semi-structured, taped interviews and 
observations. A field diary recorded each visit as well as observational visits to two large public 
meetings held by EA
3
. In July 2003 this data was written up as 49 page report to CAF and to EA 
(Scott, 2003). Sections of this were subsequently incorporated in the national publication. 
(Pharoah, Scott & Fisher, 2004); 
 18/3/05 – 12/5/05: two day visits as part of preparations for a second publication (Russell & 
Scott, 2007); 
 2006 – 2009: informal discussions, correspondence and exchange of documents (EA material, 
legal documents, press cuttings) with the EA gatekeeper who had liaised between 2002 and 
2005. 
The ‘black box’ analogy 
So-called black boxes have been devised to help the aeronautical industry monitor normal flights 
and analyse errors, malfunctions and failures. In fact, these boxes are usually bright orange and come 
in three forms: the main box containing flight data; the cockpit voice; and a quick release box. The first 
two are harder to access following a failure, and require specialist equipment. The quick release box is 
easier to access and is used to detect events that deviate from the normal. Three aspects of  the 
Black Box analogy are worth further scrutiny: 
 there are different but related instruments which collect data on pilot and plane behaviour; 
 the instruments are embedded in the organisation (=plane); 
 the characteristics of embeddedness exhibit positive and negative features. 
For the social researcher the analogy has relevance to the extent that s/he recognises and uses 
different data collection approaches and has an understanding of the advantages of the embedded 
interviewee or piece of internal documentation. Yet, at the same time, that same insider perspective 
can be limiting because it frequently lacks a comparative overview of the external environments. There 
is also a tendency for accounts internal to an agency to be defensive of its reputation even during 
failing times, especially if the informant has a vested interest in keeping their job alive. 
Clearly, the concept of a Black Box as an all-seeing analytical machine is a dangerous one 
because: „We have an awful predilection for the brain, a far from innocent desire to turn it into a „black 
box‟ that explains all, that solves all‟ (Baumard, 2001, p.58). The same author goes on to warn us of 
the ‘limits’ to human understanding because of a combination of physiological, biological, material and 
even spiritual factors. A similar stance must be the case for the qualitative researcher and his or her 
informants and interviewees, however embedded they have become in the social contexts under 
scrutiny. Nevertheless, whenever a plane (or, in this case, a social enterprise) crashes, the search 
begins for the ‘black’ (= orange) boxes. It is hoped that real-time information will contextualise and 
provide clues in the search for an explanation of the event. In the case of Enterprise Action the first 
two phases of the research constitute elements of real-time and retrospective observation and 
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commentary. These have subsequently been augmented by an unbroken sequence of direct 
discussion and documentary exchange with a previous employee, who not only walked away from the 
wreckage, but also became increasingly committed to helping construct a more rounded view of the 
failure. It has become apparent that much post-crash commentary (by the media, local politicians and 
third  sector professionals) has tended to concentrate on the ‘plane’ (i.e. Enterprise Action) and the 
‘pilots’ (EA Director and Deputy), with virtually no regard for the external environment (the ‘air’, 
‘weather conditions’ and other ‘aircraft’). The analogy is useful therefore, to the extent that it alerts the 
reader to these alternative dimensions and prevents what has become the conventional myopia. 
However, one danger inherent in drawing greater attention to external factors is that the argument 
can become too polarised: the causes of failure are either internal or external. In reality it is more likely 
that an interaction of influences is at work, although the fact that internal features appear to be more 
easily controllable encourages a focus on them. The EA research was primarily concerned with the 
internal dynamics of the organisation but soon came to realise these could not be isolated from a 
wider set of opportunities and constraints. Three illustrations are indicative of the complexity of shifting 
the research emphasis to the external environment: 
 EA had generated a diagram purporting to show its links with external agencies-the boxes and 
lines were complex and appeared to represent all the links without any differentiation in terms of 
frequency or intensity of relationship; 
 Annual Reports contained lists of names and organisations to be thanked but the lists were no 
more than that; 
 the nearest insight into how EA discriminated amongst its external relationships came via the 
list of invitees to the Royal Visit. It appeared that there was strong representation from EA staff, 
trustees and users, local churches, small business, legal and banking with low prominence 
given to local politicians, public sector employees and medium/large industry. 
Enterprise Action: origins and growth  
EA emerged in the early 1990s as a church/community response to sudden mass unemployment in 
the dominant local industry. Several key staff (including the two top managers) have been ever-
present and shared professional backgrounds in youth work. Local churches have supplied several 
Board members since the start, and reinforced the strong commitment to a social mission. The original 
ingredients of this mission were two-fold i.e. 1) to enable young people to „take their places as valued, 
contributing members of the community‟, and 2) assist young people „into full employment‟ (EA Annual 
Report: 1993-4).  
Ten years on, EA had confirmed its prominence with two Royal visits and one from the then Home 
Secretary. It had also ‘discovered’ Social Enterprise and expressed this in twelve aims and fifty eight 
objectives across thirteen A4 pages. (EA Strategic Plan: 2003-8). Less than four years later, it 
experienced police intervention and liquidation. 
This section briefly outlines key moments of growth and is then followed by a) a description of EA’s 
fall, and b) an exploration of the dimensions and causes of its fall, with particular reference to research 
issues. 
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Enterprise Action: Key Dates 
1993 May Established from Church- Community base. 
1993 June First worker (later became Chief Executive). 
1995  First independent projects. 
1998-
2001 
 
Strategic Plan listed 12 EA projects. 
 
1998 April Charitable Company limited by Guarantee. 
2000  Chief Executive appointed Deputy Lieutenant of the county. 
2001  18 projects listed, with 102 employees; first Royal visit. 
2002 June £400k grants for furniture workshop. 
2002 November  Community Hall project (£1.5m) launched. 
2003 April 
Second Royal visit; Chief Executive awarded MBE and Regional Social 
Entrepreneur of the Year. 
2003 October Visit of Home Secretary. 
2004-
2006 
 
Mounting losses, debts, non-payment of VAT, but not in the public 
domain until early 2007. 
2006  
Chief Executive awarded Regional Social Entrepreneur for a second 
time. 
2006- 
2007 
Nov - Jan 
 
Suspension / Resignation of Chief and Deputy Executive; Police 
Investigation. 
2007 April Liquidation begins. 
2008 July 
Closure of Community Hall which was sold later in the year to a 
property developer. 
2010 Feb February-Final meeting of the Liquidation process. 
 
Three aspects in EA’s fifteen year life are given prominence in the next sections: 
1. apparent project ‘inflation’ – twelve are listed in 1998, only three years after the establishment of 
the first truly independent projects; 
2. very high profile recognition and endorsement – between 2000 and 2006, EA hosted two Royal 
visits, one Home Secretary, received c. £2 million in grants, whilst its Chief Executive received 
four regional and national awards; 
3. recognition and growth coincided with below-the-radar organisational and financial crises. 
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Enterprise Action: the fall 
The demise of EA made its truly public ‘debut’ with a front-page spread in the local evening paper: 
„Charity bosses suspended: probe into how funds were used‟ (11/1/07). Within EA, demise moved 
beyond gossip with a legal struggle between the two executive officers and the Management Board 
from late November, 2006. By January 22
nd
 2007, the former had resigned, later to be dramatically 
arrested (Charity Bosses Arrested, 7/2/07). A view from inside added to the quasi-criminal flavour: 
„What a day yesterday, once again we are front-page news. The police arrived in 
numbers yesterday and arrested X and Y. They are now out on bail without charge. My 
filing cabinet (as with all the others) is now empty. Hard drives were removed or copied. 
So we are just waiting to see what happens next‟ (EA Research gatekeeper, 7/2/07).  
From January 11
th
 to August 20
th
 there were at least 10 articles in the local press plus one or two in 
a national magazine. At the heart of the stories were references to financial mismanagement. Two 
themes held it all together i.e. personalities and their probity (or alleged lack of it) on the one hand, 
and the fate of the organisation on the other. ‘Closure’ took place at different rates and with uneven 
detail both in the press and in the experience of EA staff, volunteers and trainees. On May 24
th
, 2008, 
front page headlines announced ‘Pair Cleared’. This was, however, qualified by the emphasis in the 
article on insufficient evidence, plus references to the paperwork being handed on to the Official 
Receiver. The implication of all this was clear - smoke is normally associated with fire. About six 
months later the Community Hall, EA’s jewel in the crown, was sold to a property developer at a tiny 
fraction
4
 of its refurbishment cost. No public analysis of EA’s contribution has since been forthcoming 
except via references to fragments about subsequent sub-project closures. Failure had been defined 
in personal and financial terms, and was well and truly complete by the end of 2008. 
Making sense of the fall – opening the ‘black boxes’  
Two questions frame any consideration of failure, as well as the accompanying research dilemmas: 
1. how far was the public focus on the two leaders of EA justified, and to what extent did this close 
down alternative lines of enquiry? Here, a strong discourse could be termed ‘prominent leaders 
with weak systems’; 
2. is there evidence that the demise of Enterprise Action can be linked to factors outside the 
control of its staff and trustees? Here, there are signs (often in fragmentary form) that EA was 
operating in a ‘failing’ town, in the sense that ‘Steeltown’
5
 lacked many of the economic, political 
and social resources to respond adequately to successive waves of rising unemployment. 
Most attention in the initial two research phases centred on Enterprise Action and its managers, 
both in the core administration and at sub-project level. The basic terms of reference of the Charities 
Aid Foundation (CAF) sponsored research established this organisational focus at the outset, which 
was in turn confirmed by another agency in the post-mortem phase. For example, in the early stages 
of failure (when recovery still seemed an option) a worker from the regional office of the Development 
Trusts Association (DTA) was deputed to provide assistance. He subsequently identified three key 
dimensions of failure, relating to: 
 the competence of the Management Board (Trustees); 
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 the nature of local professional advice from both lawyers and accountants; 
 the strategy of EA as epitomised by its Community Hall project (telephone interview 21/2/07). 
In brief, the DTA conclusions could be characterised respectively as about low/uneven 
competence, contradictory advice and an over-ambitious strategy. How far and in what ways are these 
conclusions evident from the ‘Black Box’ evidence i.e. from research conducted during the life (rather 
than after the death) of EA? In the account that follows, data will be presented from direct observation, 
formal interviews, semi-participant observation as well as informal conversations. 
Research diary entries: 
„Met the Director and assistant. Friendly (instantly), informal. Sat round a rickety table, 
door still open, lots of interruptions. The walls were covered in flip-chart, felt-tip and 
„Strategic Columns‟ – none had been filled in.‟ (30/5/02). 
Nearly a year later 
„… a new „In-Out‟ notice-board by the main door, neatly positioned below an equally new 
„Investors in People‟ plaque. It contained 17 names, all designated as „Out‟, although I 
had seen at least half within the hour.‟ (27/3/03). 
Between these two dates, I examined EA documents in an attempt to identify its organisational 
shape and to explore whether the diary observations about apparent impression management could 
be corroborated. By June 2003, the EA Strategic Plan referred to 18 sub-projects
6
, yet an interim 
report (Scott, 2003) a few weeks later described project ‘inflation’ (= over reporting), without much 
regard for project turnover (= new, closed, in ‘suspended animation’). More specific data was provided 
in a series of interviews with a newly-appointed ‘Information and Systems’ manager, who noted: 
 an active sub-project count of between 10 and 13 – dispute continued as to the accepted EA 
definition of a sub-project; 
 a staff count of between 44 and 50; 
 a trainee count of 97 active and 217 on file; 
 a volunteer count of 23 with 40 on file (Scott, 2003, 12). 
The manager concluded: 
„This is probably the first time that EA management have had real figures regarding the 
ratio of staff to trainees. This is very serious stuff.‟ (ibid) 
Clearly, what this person wanted was greater clarity in the face of confusing basic data. This same 
point was made by a regionally-based regeneration professional, when contributing to the post-
mortem on EA i.e. 
„It‟s important to have good financial planning and clear objectives to manage the difficult 
balance between running a business and a social benefit organisation‟ (National 
magazine, 2003). 
‘Clarity’, in relation to management principle and practice, has almost attained the status of 
‘Motherhood and Apple Pie’ – beyond critical scepticism. The Chief Executive of EA hinted however at 
a different, more fluid approach i.e.: 
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„We have got a strange collection of structures… I‟m less concerned with the structure 
questions – they‟re mostly healthy. If you‟re going to challenge people, be socially 
inclusive and so on, then you‟ve got to have something like this pre-historic swamp as a 
seed-bed to grow those things‟ (Scott, 2003, 18). 
This was not the first time a biological image featured, Chameleon was as popular as swamp. 
Clarity versus Chameleon proved a recurrent tension and not necessarily a mutually exclusive one In 
other words when different staff asked for clarity (e.g. about numbers of employees, volunteers, former 
users in jobs) a common response from the two managers centred on the inherent fluidity of EA which 
(they would argue) precluded what might be considered a waste of scarce resources in search for 
more solid data. ‘Good Housekeeping’ was more about flexibility and sensitivity to the individual needs 
of the users. Reports from sub-committees and monitoring of progress on action points were lower 
down the priority list. 
To what extent do different research approaches confirm this recurrent tension? 
1. interview – of the most active member of the Management Board, who visited EA two or three 
times each week: „We never have enough time… to discuss what I‟d call the really important 
points‟ (Pharoah, Scott & Fisher, 2004, 41); 
2. observation – of an internal meeting for sub-project managers. The field diary records a degree 
of formality, in that minutes were taken, but two-thirds of the managers were absent and few of 
those who attended brought copies of previous minutes. The Chief and Deputy Executives 
ducked in and out of the 53 minute meeting, so three different people chaired the discussion. 
Eighteen items were introduced, but there was little evidence of discussion or action points 
(Diary notes and Scott, 2003); 
3. semi-participant observation – of the public launch of EA’s Strategic Plan. The Chief Executive 
closed the meeting with a 14 minute declaration of vision and values; this speech contained no 
explicit references to the Strategic Plan (a copy of which had been given to every guest). There 
were no detailed references to social enterprise. 
Both the Chief and Deputy were consistently pleasant and informal. Yet, they were described as 
being ‘too strong’ for other members of the core administrative team, even whilst demonstrating high 
levels of informality and flexibility, particularly in relation to the constantly shifting demands of the 
external environment. When reference is made to ‘Chameleon-like’ behaviour this can sound 
pejorative. But, the mix of pleasantness maintained high levels of staff loyalty, whilst the centralised 
and opaque executive control may have had some limiting effect on potentially de-stabilising debates. 
When the Community Hall became operational the ‘Pleasant/Opaque’ style was inadequate. The soft 
centralised approach ensured a commitment to social values but was never enough to capture the 
demands of enterprise. The issue of mission was always central. Some trainees were taken on 
seemingly to underline the inclusivity of the organisation. But, they didn’t always attract any or a 
sufficient fee income; hence they played a small part in the erosion of financial sustainability. It is 
possible that EA had adopted the ‘Social Enterprise’ label because this had become a prominent 
policy area, apparently associated with new funds. It is also possible that EA was able to exploit the 
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double halo effect with some external sponsors – as a Third Sector Social Enterprise it offered itself as 
an appropriate vehicle with which to respond to certain dimensions of social need. 
But, just as EA had first emerged in response to the dramatic downturn in the fortunes of the town’s 
dominant employer, so it must make sense to consider how far and in what ways institutions beyond 
EA played a part in its changing fortunes. Here the alleged strength of the Black Boxes – their 
embeddedness in the plane (=EA), were also their greatest weakness. My determination to become as 
embedded as possible (by developing relations of trust) like the real Black Boxes, meant that I had 
less time left to consider: 
 the pool of local professionals; 
 the impact of the local economy; 
 the position of local political structures; 
 EA’s relationship with Steeltown’s civil society; 
 the viability of local markets in relation to the EA sub-project portfolio; 
 the size and reliability of extra-local sources of funding; 
 the impact of high status patrons of EA on local perceptions and attitudes. 
Whilst details have been gathered about some of the above, there remain more questions than 
answers in the following section. Steeltown has experienced a twenty year decline in employment 
opportunities with male unemployment more than three times the national average. Not surprisingly, 
there are lower than average percentages of professional and managerial groups. No doubt much 
could have been expected of the local authority. From the early 1990’s, the council has attempted to 
bend job creation and regeneration towards the poorest, yet its 1999 Strategic Plan announced that 
they had only just begun to even prepare a Borough-wide strategy for community-based economic 
development (A Strategic Plan for Steeltown Borough, January 1999, 26). Nearly four years later, one 
of the consultancies hired to facilitate these initiatives concluded (as part of its evaluation of a £5.6 
million single Regeneration Budget) that, whilst there is a great deal of commitment to the voluntary 
and community sectors: 
 the different stakeholders failed to agree on what constituted a community enterprise; 
 new jobs from within the hird sector were few in number; 
 the hard to reach were not being reached (SRB Evaluation, November, 2002). 
The aforementioned ‘commitment’ may be less comprehensive than it first appears. The local 
authority’s own plan noted that: 
„… there is much evidence that this sector is under-developed. According to the rule of 
thumb adopted by the Community Development Foundation, Steeltown should have 
about 180 community groups or organisations – the actual figure is probably half that‟ (A 
Strategic Plan for Steeltown Borough, January 1999, 26). 
Other commentators claimed that the local policy makers didn’t take the third sector seriously, local 
political leaders did not ‘appreciate’ EA’s income generation strategies, and allegedly that ‘cut throat’ 
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competition existed within the larger third sector agencies (Scott, 2003, 34). EA’s Chief Executive 
tended to corroborate much of this: 
„I think they (policy makers and politicians) regard us with suspicion, possibly as 
threatening because we don‟t necessarily work in traditional ways. We‟re relatively 
uncontrollable because of our extra-local resourcing‟ (Scott 2003, 35). 
Some councillors (and some third sector agencies) were totally negative: 
„…it (EA) rode on the back of ten thousand redundancies for too many years and got 
away with it‟ (local political actor). 
Even political support was not enough; different sub-projects in EA often had to navigate a mesh of 
relationships with local schools, probation, social services, health or the Learning and Skills Council. 
Often, the end results of different ‘navigations’ were variations in the terms and conditions of different 
service contracts. In its first decade, EA management had juggled financial relationships relatively 
adeptly, if not without periodic crises. They operated from a low-cost (if inadequate) building and were 
edging into new markets (both in welfare provision and, to a lesser extent, commercial areas). The 
large Community Hall project proved to be several steps too far. ‘Thin’ relationships with Steeltown 
politicians and periodic interruptions of large cashflows may have accentuated EA’s failing position, 
but in the absence of more solid evidence these remain speculative conclusions.  
EA’s Chief Executive was part of Steeltown’s tiny upper middle class (with links even higher). 
There were social relations into local landed gentry and thence to very senior Royals, whereas 
Steeltown’s political culture had grown out of the hierarchies and union solidarities based on the 
dominant employer. The Chief Executive kept the councillors at arm’s length, whilst they perceived EA 
management as „a law unto themselves‟. Overlaid on these social layers were personal antagonisms. 
When, therefore, funding was sought or influence needed, help from within the local political and 
policy worlds was less forthcoming than might have been the case. 
Extra-local cash flow problems were a constant worry, but became a hugely significant problem as 
the Community Hall opened: 
„One „running sore‟ throughout the whole period was the £180k (approx) owed by the 
Government Regional Agency for completed Social Fund contracts during 1999-2001. 
After nine audits and dealing with twenty three different desk officers, some of the money 
was paid in 2006, by then it was too late‟ (EA Research gate-keeper, 1/5/08). 
There are clearly a number of overlapping explanations of organisational failure. Each of these 
presents the researcher with different methodological dilemmas, which the next section must now 
consider. 
 
 
Lessons in failure – the prospects for researchers 
How we research failing processes and failure will be made easier to the extent that individuals and 
institutions feel able to talk about these topics. Only then is it worth constructing research approaches 
which encourage trusting relations. In this respect the primary problem is not methodological but one 
 
 
 
 
 
17 
of assumptions within closed or open cultures. For example, many commentators, from within policy, 
practice, the media and academe, exude confidence. The evidence from EA and other sources 
(Gawande, 2003; Ormerod, 2006; Seanor & Meaton, 2008; Walshe et al, 2009) suggests, however, 
that organisations operate in inherently complex worlds and the best any of them can hope for is 
degrees of internal coherence. For example, Steeltown’s largest employer was reported, during the 
final days of EA, as being four years late and £1 billion over budget on its latest construction project 
(National Broadsheet, 12/5/07).  A greater degree of realism in assessing the financial sustainability of 
agencies such as EA is surely the lesson to be taken from these details. 
As far as many social researchers are concerned, this realism requires an acceptance that: „…the 
certainty to which social science is prone needs to be laid to rest in the graveyard of twentieth century 
conceits‟ (Back, 2007,1). 
Some of the advantages of the ‘Black Boxes’ in Enterprise Action related to the qualitative 
approach, over time, of the research. Formal statements and documentary rhetoric of EA could be 
checked in successive visits, by interviews, conversations, observation and participation. On the other 
hand two disadvantages persisted. The first of these is inherent in any qualitative research where the 
field worker operates alone: intensive involvement in one corner precludes comparable access and 
involvement in another. A second inherent problem, more specific to Failure Studies, concerns 
disclosure. During several years of intermittent research, where good relationships with friendly people 
had been established, interviewees and informants were clearly not revealing much of their knowledge 
of impending organisational meltdown. Loyalty to the agency, their colleagues, reluctance to be 
responsible for ‘making things worse’, and a determination to hang on in the hope that things would 
get better, all played a part. After the crash, some people became more open (the former gatekeeper 
to the research phases
7
) whilst others have been totally unresponsive
8
 to successive drafts (the 
former Chief Executive). Social researchers may also play a part in this culture of reticence: too often 
they prioritise the development of relationships at the expense of asking potentially awkward 
questions. A close reading of the two publications which included details of EA before the final crash 
(Pharoah, Scott & Fisher, 2004; Russell & Scott, 2007) provides numerous clues to organisational 
tension and incoherence. More critical commentary (such as this paper) only surfaced afterwards.  
And then there is the problem of the single case-study. Enterprise and Steeltown cannot represent 
everywhere. They may, however, encourage a wider perspective on social enterprise developments. 
How useful is the label ‘Failing Town’ in relation to Steeltown? Even if it is not possible to answer this 
question, the very act of posing it reminds us that EA did not fail alone. During the period of EA’s final 
demise (2006 –8) a further handful of small projects collapsed, a major infrastructure organisation 
went into administration amidst inquiries into financial irregularities and the local Social Enterprise 
Network concluded its three year programme (on a £600k grant) by announcing that it had established 
only 20 new jobs
9
. 
What would a ‘Failure Policy’ look like? 
Ambitious organisations accept that they must plan ahead and that a key theme in their planning 
will be the identification, discussion and adaptation of what is commonly termed ‘good’ or ‘best 
practice’. No doubt within the latter there will be references about what to do when things go wrong. 
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But greater attention would need to be paid to the potential ‘warning signs’, before any crisis is 
reached. To return to the aeronautical metaphor, it is not so much about brief displays with oxygen 
masks and inflatable life-jackets and more about the training, de-briefing and re-training of pilots and 
cabin crew before any crash occurs. Such an approach assumes that there will inevitably be degrees 
of ignorance, uncertainty and error which require anticipation in a strategic way. Halos, of whatever 
kind, can be distracting in arguing for such an approach because they take too complacent or too 
crisis-oriented a view. Therefore, what might be termed a ‘Failure Policy’: 
1. would begin from the assumption that all of us must grapple with our ignorance more wisely 
(see Gawande, 2003, 8); 
2. systems for disclosure are common in large institutions such as the aeronautics industry and 
health services. These anticipate individual reluctance to admit error, by promising various non-
sanction arrangements for those who ‘open up’. Smaller organisations such as EA could 
operate more informally with non-managerial consultants/mentors, who could facilitate at least 
partial disclosure. The problem for researchers is they need to get close enough for long 
enough to build at least partial or fragmentary trust; 
3. disclosure is as nothing if it doesn’t encourage some forms of diagnosis. The DTA have drawn 
up a framework of ‘traffic-lights’
10
 to encourage collective discussion of mutually agreed early 
warning signs; 
4. but, have organisations got the ability to digest and absorb what some have called the lessons 
of ‘poor practice’ (e.g. Walshe et al, 2009)? Much will depend on the extent to which the stories 
of failure are sufficiently sensitive to the realities of the people charged with carrying complex, 
contradictory everyday life forward. Social researchers can help people write their own stories if 
they are in a place long enough to develop sufficient trust. Walshe and colleagues suggest that 
audits and inspections can provide starting-points, but their focus was on the larger public 
services. EA and many third sector social enterprises are much less likely to be formally audited 
or inspected; 
5. the heart of any Failure Policy would need to include a statement of underlying purposes. For 
example, in the event of organisational decline/signs of failing systems, are responses to be 
framed by resuscitation principles and skills or those of the abattoir? In other words, instead of 
proceeding to liquidation could greater energies have been invested in retaining the Hall for 
public use? As events have unfolded, one piece of ‘accounting’ needs to note a) that the 
revenue from the building’s initial sale was only 20% more than the liquidator’s fee and b) the 
subsequent rapid re-sale of the building brought in a five-fold profit for the property developer 
concerned. Meanwhile, public money has been invested in the regeneration of another hall only 
a few streets away. Who profits from failure must be an urgent subject for policy debate. 
Enterprise Action’s decline and ultimate closure is a case in point; the responses of all those 
involved underline the merits of a research approach which takes the longer view. What 
happened afterwards, when the doors had all been closed, and the staff had gone home, 
reveals the extent to which any of the parties had anything resembling a Failure Policy. 
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Failure was not a one-off event. Even in its public guise, leaving aside questions about the extent 
to which early signs were visible to at least some of EA staff, it took more than two years. Suspension 
and arrest of two senior staff, liquidation, closure, and sale of the Community Hall began in November, 
2007 and ended in February 2010. In the early period EA senior staff and the Development Trusts 
Association attempted resuscitation but the mode of Failure Policy which eventually became dominant 
was that of the abattoir not the hospital. Joint liquidators were appointed on April 20
th
, 2007. They 
delivered their twenty page report at the beginning of March, 2008, and the final liquidation report 
(15pp) to meetings of members and creditors on February 23
rd
, 2010. 
By the end of the year the Community Hall had been sold at a London auction for £110,000. The 
web site of the new owner, a Venture Capital company, boasted that it possessed the appropriate 
skills to deal with a failed enterprise because the owner had only recently lost tens of millions. Eight 
months later the first property developer (PD1) sold the Hall to another property company (PD2) for 
£500,000, whilst remaining in place as the ‘manager’ of the building. The local paper summarised 
different local perspectives (Evening paper, 12/8/09), ranging from ‘disgusting’ (local charity and 
former tenant) to ‘questions’ about the initial sale (estate agent) and ‘you have to admire the people 
that bought it because they made a fantastic investment’ (estate agent). The asset had not been 
safeguarded for public use: extending the abattoir metaphor, the Community Hall was treated like a 
carcass to be carved up, and then carved again-for private gain. At the very end of this failure story, 
one research lesson is that ‘Black Boxes’ or different research perspectives inside the social 
enterprise proved useful, but partial vantage points from which to observe, participate, interview and 
converse. On the other hand, being able to retain contact with unfolding events (a feature dependent 
as much on the accident of the convergent, non-academic interests of two people) required thinking 
outside the box. 
In some respects the study of this failure has a tendency towards a gloomy, even angry, 
conclusion. But, different research approaches with their strengths and weaknesses have been 
explored and the positive features of Enterprise Action still shine through. For all the errors, individual 
and collective, many people had positive experiences, not otherwise available in a failing town. Failure 
then becomes not one monolithic state at the end of something, but multi-layered and wrapped up in 
qualitative experiences along the way. To have attempted as much as Enterprise Action may even 
constitute a success in the midst of failure. 
An endnote for researchers  
So many organisations ‘crash’ and leave little or no evidence of their experiences of failing and 
failure. Like the plane that disappears into the sea or explodes on a distant hillside, there may not 
even be a Black (or Orange) Box to open. Enterprise Action’s life and death has become more 
available for post mortems because of the twin coincidence of two pre-crash research exercises and 
continuing (if limited) contacts with a reasonably well-placed survivor. Unlike the recent account 
(Langewiesche, 2009 ) of the successful crash of the US Airways flight from La Guardia airport on 
January 15
th
,2009,into the River Hudson when all were saved, Enterprise Action has few publicly 
accessible witnesses. No-one to recount their equivalent stories to those of the US plane, downed 
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because it crossed the path of migratory Canada geese, hit five and sucked three into the engines. 
Saved by a special pilot and ‘saved’ for future studies of failure. 
At least three dilemmas and questions require further consideration: 
 given the likelihood of limited resources, how far and in what ways can researchers look beyond 
the organisation into the complex social, political and economic environments which help shape 
success and failure? Should there be more studies that concentrate on the ‘ecologies of 
influence’ which lie outwith specific agencies? 
 how useful are the concepts of a ‘Failing Town’ and a ‘Failing Civil Society’? In view of the 
continued influence of the Double Halo effect, whereby both the third sector and social 
enterprise tend to be viewed relatively uncritically, this seems like a project whose time has 
come; 
 what balance should be struck between researcher-researched relationships and the obligation 
to reveal poor/failing behaviour? At the very least, it may be more useful (if not more 
comfortable) to introduce emergent data of this kind to managers before any crash. The risk of 
endangering trust having to be weighed against potentially fruitful disclosures and discussions. 
Research on Enterprise Action began because it had been singled out as an exemplary 
organisation-a literal prize-winning success. Failure as a topic emerged after the original sponsored 
research had been concluded. Yet, the opportunity to catch a series of glimpses of the wreckage and 
aftermath offered itself to this researcher, a person with some (semi-retired) time but few other 
resources. Social researchers, especially qualitative ones, must be alert to seize unexpected 
opportunities, even if not completely ‘ready’ .They cannot engineer failure nor can they afford to wait 
until the last nail is in the organisational coffin. They have to make the best of the circumstances they 
find themselves in. ‘Twas ever thus. 
 
 
Endnotes
                                            
1
 ‘A’ began as gatekeeper to the researcher in that he operated ‘on behalf’ of the Chief Executive, 
arranging interviews, copying documents and filling in gaps in the arranged schedule of meetings.  
2
 Alliterative headings are meant to catch the ear and hint at a theme. In this case, the theme is of 
irregular growth and decline, both often rapid, with only uneven connections to the existence (or 
absence) of organisational capacity and competence. 
3
 One of these involved a Royal visit and has been published as an illustration of observational and 
interpretive issues in qualitative social research. (Russell & Scott, 2005, 8-12). 
4
 c.£110,000. The Community Hall absorbed over £1.8million of grants, as well as hundreds of hours 
of paid staff time and unpaid overtime / volunteering. 
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5
 ‘Steeltown’ has been dominated by a single large employer, forced since the late 1980s to make a 
series of very large down-sizings. The subsequent demographic, economic, political and civil 
society dimensions of the town have been much affected if infrequently studied. 
6
 EA constituted the overarching ‘project’, within which individual specialist activities (furniture 
making/restoring; catering; gardening etc) could be termed ‘sub-projects’. Each of the latter had 
slightly different relationships with EA’s core administration. 
7
 After the crash, he became first an informant and subsequently a friend. What encouraged the latter 
phase was a shared interest in the minutiae of Association Football. It is extremely likely that his 
willingness to operate as an informant would not have been sustained over several years purely on 
the basis of a shared interest in organisational failure! 
8
 The Chief Executive’s behaviour is not surprising, particularly given the media coverage of EA’s 
demise. References to police arrests and insufficient evidence (implying, presumably, there was 
some?) to prosecute would encourage most people to seek a more private life. For someone who 
had been awarded several honours, partly in recognition of the work of the Enterprise Action 
organisation, the crash must have been doubly painful. 
9
 After EA crashed, eight micro-businesses, employing at least twenty people, have been identified as 
emerging directly from the closure. 
10
 Up to 20 questions on a vertical axis, with Red, Amber and Green on the horizontal axis. For 
example, ‘Have we ever sought an income- generating opportunity even though it was not central 
to our core mission and values?’ Red = ‘Yes, we’re always open to new opportunities’, Amber = ‘we 
considered it, but rejected it’, Green = ‘No, we always evaluate every opportunity against our 
mission’. In this form, it feels all too logical and text-book-like, but the idea could well be adapted 
(DTA,2008). 
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